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"CHILLING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE":
A SCARECROW
Raoul Bergert
In an article entitled "Chilling Judicial Independence,"' Chief
Judge Irving R. Kaufman sounds the alarm against a pending
proposal to facilitate judicial removal of federal judges. This, he
trumpets, is "fatally misguided"; it "pose[s] an ominous threat to
... judicial independence"; I it is a "Trojan Horse," pitting "Judge
against Judge"; 3 it "may mask something more sinister"-"a
dragnet that would inevitably sweep into its grasp the maverick,
the'dissenter, the innovator"; 4 "the threat of punishment," that is,
of removal, "would project [a] dark ...

shadow" over the vital po-

tential of dissent. 5 Apparently the impeachment process to which
he clings does not "project a dark shadow," presumably because it
is quite unlikely to be invoked. What is the proposal that conjures
up such a spectral parade?
It is proposed 6 to establish a twelve-judge Judicial Conduct
and Disability Commission drawn from each circuit and the special courts, each member from a circuit to be elected by its circuit
and district judges.'
Each circuit shall have a committee of
judges to review complaints forwarded by the Commission. The
committee shall make recommendations to the Commission which
thereupon shall dismiss the complaint or initiate its own investigation, and make its recommendations to a seven-man Court on
Judicial Conduct and Disability. The Commission shall have the
burden of proving its report "by clear and convincing evidence";

t Member, Illinois and District of Columbia Bars. A.B. 1932, University of Cincinnati;
J.D. 1935, Northwestern University; LL.M. 1938, Harvard University; LL.D. 1975, University of Cincinnati; LL.D. 1978, University of Michigan.
1 88 YALE L.J. 681 (1979) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as Kaufman].
2 Id. at 683.
3 Id. at 710.
" Id. at 703. He borrowed this from Justice Douglas. R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 157-58 (1973) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as IMPEACHMENT] (citing Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 137 (1970) (dissenting opinion, Douglas, J.)).
5 Kaufman 714.
Judge Kaufman directs his criticism to S. 1423, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), which
passed the Senate on September 7, 1978. Kaufman 682. The bill was introduced as S. 295
in the 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978) and I draw thereon for details.
7 S. 295, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 381 (1978).
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and an adverse judgment may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court. 8 . At each stage the complained-of judge is entitled to

notice and a hearing. 9 "The bill," Judge Kaufman maintains, is
"unconstitutional ....
Impeachment was the only procedure the
Framers allowed for judicial removal, and they deliberately made
it unwieldy." 10

Why does Judge Kaufman, who chants the praises of "collegiality," of "collective decisionmaking" on appeal, and of the
"tightly knit" "judicial fraternity" "-a
fraternity which can repeatedly rule against a dissenter below without stifling dissentsuspect that Dr. Jekyll would become Mr. Hyde when sitting as a
court drawn from the entire nation, a sinister dragnet for dissenters? The implication that the summoned judge will suspect that
such a court would remove him for deciding for (or against) desegregation is unworthy both of the judge and of the court which
would sit on the removal hearing.' 2 To object to the trial of a
judge, for misconduct, by his judicial peers drawn from the entire
United States is to cast doubt on the fairness of the judicial process. If such a panel cannot be trusted to fairly try a "dissenter"
for alleged judicial misconduct, no more can a district judge be
trusted to try social rebels. If the process is good enough for the
common man in matters of life or death, it is good enough for
the trial of a judge's fitness to try others. As to the "chill" factor,
Justice Jackson rejected the argument that summary contempts by
the offended judge posed a threat to the independence of counsel, because "[i]t is to be doubted whether the profession will be
greatly terrorized by punishment of some of its members after...
3
extended and detached consideration" by appellate courts.'
Judges do not possess less fortitude. The proposed bill is altogether without summary elements; all is based on hearing and
trial by dispassionate judges.

s Id. §§ 382-85. The Judicial Conference shall annually elect one member of the Conference to be presiding officer of the Court, and he shall select six members of the Conference to serve with him. Id. § 385.
9 The complained-of judge is entitled to submit a written statement to the circuit
panel. Id. § 383.
10 Kaufman 683.

11 Id. at 708-10.
11 Hatton Sumners, the veteran chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, stated in
1937, "I never heard it said until today ... that three judges of the circuit court of appeals
trying a district judge might stultify themselves in order to convict an honest man and
remove him from office." 81 CONG. REc. 6184 (1937).
13 Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 13 (1952).
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Judge Kaufman notices the "dangers inherent" in trial by a
"political body" such as Congress, and the sweeping claims that
have been made by its leaders, as when Congressman Gerald Ford
maintained, with respect to Justice Douglas, that "an impeachable
offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives
considers [it] to be at a given moment in history." 14 He recognizes that "Congress has at times distorted the 'high Crimes and
Misdemeanors' language in judicial impeachments."1 5 Yet he
strangely prefers an impeachment by Congress, often riven by
political passions, often inattentive to the evidence, 1 6 to a hearing
by judges who sit and listen and are schooled to evaluate evidence
and to strive for its dispassionate appraisal. It is true that adjudication demands freedom from political pressure, but it does not
follow that a nation-wide panel of judges hearing charges of misconduct will become political pawns.
Judge Kaufman recognizes that the cumbersome impeachment process was structured for the "imperative," exceptional
case.' 7 Activists-Judge Kaufman sings the praises of the relatively recent expansion of judicial activism 18 -explain that judicial alteration of the Constitution (which is without textual warrant) is compelled by the cumbersomeness of the amendment
process. 19 If "cumbersomeness" justifies dispensing with the
amendment process, one might expect an activist to seize upon
the textual common law term "good behavior" for avoidance of
the "cumbersome" impeachment procedure. But more influential
considerations are at play. It is no secret that Congress is loath to
14 Kaufman 705-06. Because impeachable offenses, Hamilton said, are of a nature "de-

nominated POLITICAL," they "seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community,"
exposing officials "to the persecution of an intemperate or designing majority in the House
of Represeptatives." THE FEDERALIST, No. 65 (A. Hamilton), at 423-24, 428 (Mod. Lib. Ed.
1937).
11 Kaufman 705.
16 Hatton Sumners, who had participated in the impeachment of Judge Harold

Louderback, said it was "the greatest farce ever presented. At one time only three senators
were present, and for ten days we presented evidence to what was practically an empty
chamber." IMPEACHMENT 167 n.199 (citing Note, Removal of FederalJudges: A Proposed Plan,
31 ILL. L. Rv. 631, 634 (1937) (quoting TIME, Mar. 16, 1936, at 19)).
17 Kaufman 704-05.

s Id. at 684-86.
Because "the process of amendment is politically difficult, other modes of change
have emerged." McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or PresidentialAgreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: I, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 293 (1945); Kutler,
Raoul Berger's Fourteenth:A History or Ahistorical, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 511, 525 (1979)
("the path for amendment.., is often blocked by inertia or irresponsibility," hence judicial
alteration).
19
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tear itself away from urgent national problems to undertake judicial housecleaning. The veteran Hatton Sumners, chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee and participant in two out of the nine
impeachments, observed that they take "the time of the entire Senate ...away from all of the other business of a great nation, and
make them sit there for days and days. . . ." "[F]or this reason
alone," remarked Senator William McAdoo, after one such impeachment, it "is always resorted to with extreme reluctance, even
in cases of flagrant misconduct." 20 As a result, he said, "the
practical certainty that in a large majority of cases misconduct will
never be visited with impeachment is a standing invitation for
judges to abuse their authority with impunity and without fear of
removal."'
Judge Kaufman recognizes that "[i]f impeachment is designed
for occasional use only, there must be some other means of ensuring that judges do not abuse their trust."2 2 But he dismisses removal of judges for criminal offenses because of the availability of
indictment, e.g., Judges Kerner and Manton were indicted and
convicted.2 3 On the other hand, the noisome practices of District
Judge Albert W. Johnson of Pennsylvania extended over a
twenty-year period; complaints about his conduct began almost
immediately; he was under continuous investigation; a judge of
his own Circuit Court went to Washington to obtain relief. At last
he was indicted but acquitted, though his co-conspirator son, the
object of his corrupt favors, was convicted. Two of the witnesses
who had themselves been convicted refused to repeat the testimony they had given before the grand jury.2 4 Who has not
witnessed jury acquittals that leave a large area of doubt as to the
innocence of the defendant? What too of the cases which just fall
short of "beyond a reasonable doubt" but nevertheless besmirch
the court? Then there are the cases altogether devoid of criminality but yet discredit the judicial process.
Judge Kaufman would solve the problem of the senile judge
by "peer pressure. 2 5 At times that is effective; but it has also

20 IMPEACHMENT 167 (quoting 80 CONG. REC. 5934 (1936)).
2 Id. After the trial of District Judge Halsted Ritter, Congressman Chauncey W. Reed

said that Senators should not thus "be required to set aside their legislative duties, paralyzing for weeks the lawmaking function." 81 CONG. REc. 6175 (1937).
22 Kaufman 706.
23 Id.
24 IMPEACHMENT 168. See J. BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE 185 (1962).
25 Kaufman 709.
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been sadly wanting, as in the long-drawn-out effort to procure the
retirement of the aged Judge Buffington, an unwitting tool of his
corrupt associate, Judge Davis. Their associate, Circuit Judge
Biggs, finally "persuaded these elderly gentlemen to retire," but it
took "a good deal of effort and quite a long time," adding that
there is not the slightest doubt "that the present machinery for
the removal of unfit judges is inadequate," 2 6 a view earlier expressed by Justice Samuel Miller.27
Judge Kaufman, to borrow from him, has "shed the robe of
the judge ... and assumed the mantle of the advocate." 2 8 A
more judicious attitude might have prompted him to acknowledge
that his peers, Chief Justice Burger, 9 Justices Blackmun,3"
Rehnquist, 3' the late Justice Tom Clark,3 2 and former Circuit
Judge Griffin Bell3 3 saw no threat to judicial independence in
proposals for judicial removal of judges and regarded them as
constitutional. His deep-grained commitment to judicial "independence" has led him to level a barrage of pejoratives at the
contrary views I expressed in 1970, in a study that was the product of scholarly curiosity, without commitments to one side
the other.3 4 If I failed to bring the study into focus, it was not
26 IMPEACHMENT 168 n.204 (quoting Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1966) (testimony
of Judge John Biggs, Jr., 3d Cir.)).
27 In 1878 Justice Samuel Miller wrote, it "must be confessed that the means provided
... for removing a judge, who for any reason is found to be unfit for his office, is very
unsatisfactory ... [and] after the experience of nearly a century ... must be pronounced
inadequate." IMPEACHMENT 169 n.205 (quoting Address by Mr. Justice Miller, New York
State Bar Ass'n Annual Banquet, 2 N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N REP. 40 (1878)). See also C.E.
HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT 76 (1928). One expects that a judge will take account of

such weighty opinion opposed to his own.
28 Kaufman 708.
29 Nomination of Warren E. Burger, of Virginia, to be ChiefJustice of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1969).
'o Nomination of Hary A. Blackmun, of Minnesota, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court

of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 52
(1970).
31 The Independence of FederalJudges: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 330 (1970) (statement of W.
Rehnquist, Asst. Attorney General of the United States).
32 Clark, Judicial Self-Regulation-Its Potential, 35 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 40-41
(1970).
3 Judicial Tenure Act: Hearingson S. 1110 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 141 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings] (statement of G. Bell, attorney at law).
34 Berger, Impeachment of Judges and "Good Behavior" Tenure, 79 YALE L.J. 1475 (1970);
this article formed the basis of Chapter 4 of my IMPEACHMENT, against which Judge Kaufman directs his fire.
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because of bias or a desire to tailor the facts to a particular result.
Consequently Judge Kaufman's charges that my reading of
sources was "highly selective," that I "excised," i.e. suppressed
language, and relied on incomplete quotations,3 5 comports better
with over-heated advocacy than with the detachment befitting a
judge. One thing needs at once to be made clear: neither Professor Burke Shartel, who in 1930 pioneered the view opposed to
that of Judge Kaufman, 36 nor I, were prompted by "[dlispleasure
with the outcome or trend of decisions." 3 7 My 1970 study followed on the heels of my defense of the legitimacy of judicial
review. 3 8 Not until 1974, when I began my study of the fourteenth amendment, did I begin to perceive the judicial takeover
of functions that the Framers had withheld.3 9
COMMON LAW TERMS

"Led by Berger," states Judge Kaufman, the "theorists have
reached across the ocean in an attempt to bolster their position"
respecting the meaning of "good behavior" and the machinery for
its effectuation.4 ° Where but to England are we to look for the
meaning of common law terms? Both "good behavior" tenure and
"impeachment for 'high crimes and misdemeanors,'" Hamilton
said, were "copied" from the English institutions. 4 1 It has long
been a canon of construction that when the Framers employed
common law terms, the common law "definitions," as Justice Story
3'Kaufman

698, 697.

36 IMPEACHMENT 178; Kaufman 691 n.70. See Shartel, FederalJudges-Apportionment,
Supervision, and Removal-Some Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REV. 485, 723,
870 (1930).
3" Kaufman 681.
38 R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969).
39 R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT (1977).

0 Kaufman 694.
41 THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (A. Hamilton) at 425, No. 78 (A. Hamilton) at 511 (Mod.
Lib. Ed. 1937). "'The provisions of the Constitution of the United States,' wrote Holmes,
'are organic legal institutions transplated from English soil.' " Jones, Introduction to
POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LEGAL CONTINUITY at xiv (H.W. Jones ed. 1976). Professor
Harry W. Jones comments that "American continuity with the English past was ...something natural, inevitable and predetermined by the circumstances and culture of the time."
Jones, The Common Law in the United States in id. at 91, 92. See id. at 97. Where Hamilton
laid down in No. 78 of The Federalist that judges "should be bound down by strict rules and
precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case," Jones
asks, "where were the American courts to look to find them, other than in the corpus of
English common law doctrine?" Id. at 101-02.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:822

held, "are necessarily included, as much as if they stood in the
text" of the Constitution. 42 Earlier Chief Justice Marshall, considering the meaning of "levying war," held that treason "is a
technical term.... It is scarcely conceivable that the term was not
employed by the framers of our constitution in the sense which
had been affixed to it by those from whom we borrowed it." 43
They looked to the common law for the meaning of such common law terms as "felony," "ex post facto," and the like. 44 But,
Judge Kaufman urges, the "difficulty is that neither 'good Behaviour' nor the procedure for determining its breach is anywhere explicitly defined in Article III-or, in fact, anywhere else
in the Constitution." 45 That same "difficulty" exists with respect
to "high crimes and misdemeanors" to which he would confine
4 6
removals; for its definition we must look to English practice.

42 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820). Ex parte Grossman, 267
U.S. 87, 109 (1925) ("The statesmen and lawyers of the Convention ... were born and
brought up in the atmosphere of the common law, and thought and spoke in its vocabulary.... [Wihen they came to put their conclusions into the form of fundamental law in a
compact draft, they expressed them in terms of the common law, confident that they could
be shortly and easily understood.").
4' United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 159 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693). That was
earlier held by Justice Iredell in Fries' Case, 9 F. Cas. 826, 911-12 (C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 5,
126), new trial granted on other grounds, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 515 (1799).
44 For "felony," see Madison in the Virginia Ratification Convention, 3 J. ELLIOT,
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 484 (2d ed. Washington 1836). For "ex post facto," see John Dickinson, 2
M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 448 (1911). So too,
Chief Justice Marshall consulted English practice for the effect of a pardon. IMPEACHMENT

131 n.43 (citing United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833)).
5 Kaufman 691; see also id. at 698.
46 IMPEACHMENT 67-71. Since "high crimes and misdemeanors," are not defined by any
statute, Justice Story stated, "Resort, then, must be had either to parliamentar practice
and the common law, in order to ascertain what are high crimes and misdemeanors, or the
whole subject must be left to the arbitrary discretion of the Senate .. " IMPEACHMENT 87
n.161 (quoting I J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
§§ 796-97, at 580-81 (5th ed. 1891)). So too, the judicial "contempt" power was not
"explicitly" provided for but was derived from English practice. Berger, Constructive Contempt: A Post-Mortem, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 602, 618 (1942). Nor is there an "explicit" provision
for the separation of powers, a basic tenet of our democratic system. Judicial review itself
was not "explicitly" provided for; in fact it ran counter to British practice at the time of the
Revolution. I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 91 (Oxford 1765);
whereas there were a number of common law definitions of "misbehavior." IMPEACHMENT
160-61.
Professor Jones observes:
Manifestly the standard for removal of a judge should be violation of "good
behavior" rather than guilt of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors," and a judicial
commission would seem far better qualified than the two Houses of Congress
for the disciplinary task involved. The demands an impeachment and im-
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"Good behavior" tenure reaches back across the centuries. In
1803 Judge St. George Tucker, a pioneer commentator on the
Constitution, noted that "these words (by a long train of decisions
in England...) ... imported an office or estate ...

determinable

only by [the grantee's] death, or breach of good behavior." 47 Bacon's Abridgment explained that under "a grant to a man for so
long time as he shall behave himself well ...

his misbehavior in

each case determines [i.e. terminates] his Interest," as was held by
Coke, and in 1693 by Chief Justice Holt. 4 8

A grant during "good

behavior" is simply an estate on condition subsequent which is
forfeited by non-performance of the condition. Blackstone refers
to "all the forfeitures which are given by law of life estates ... for
any acts done by the tenant himself, that are incompatible with
the estate." 4 9 Given termination upon misbehavior there must be
a power to remove the officer, Lord Mansfield held, lest "offices
might be forfeited for offences; and yet there would be no means
to carry the law into execution." 50 Without such a remedy the
limitation of tenure to so long as the grantee "doth behave himself well" would be an impotent formula. "[Wihere the patentee
hath done an act that amounts to a forfeiture of the grant,"
Blackstone stated, "the remedy to repeal the patent is by writ of
scire facias."5 1
"The most daring aspect of this argument," Judge Kaufman
writes, "is Berger's hypothesis that by adopting the substantive
standard of good behavior, the Framers implied the availability of
a particular procedural device, scire facias. But the Framers never

peachment trial make on an already overcrowded Congressional schedule have
made the impeachment process almost a dead letter in all but great matters like
the Nixon impeachment....
Jones, The Common Law in the United States in POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LEGAL CONTINUITY
114 (H.W. Jones ed. 1976).
17 IMPEACHMENT 125-26 (quoting St. G. Tucker, Appendix in 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 353 (St. G. Tucker ed. 1803)).
" Id. at 126 (quoting 3 M. BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAWS 733 (5th ed.

Dublin 1786) (1st ed. London 1736)).
9 Id. at 133 n.55 (quoting 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 46, at 153).
*o Id. at 127 n.25 (quoting Rex v. Richardson, 31 Geo. II B.R. 517, 539, 97 Eng. Rep.
426, 438 (1758)). In 1862, the English crown law officers rendered an opinion with reference to judicial "good behavior" tenure that "when a public office is held during good
behavior, a power [of removal for misbehavior] must exist somewhere." Id. at 127 n.25
(quoting 2 A. TODD, ON PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND 729 (London 1869)).
Senator David Stone drew the same conclusion in 1803. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 72 (1802); see
text of Stone's remarks accompanying note 156 infra.

51 IMPEACHMENT 133 n.53 (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 46, at 260-61).
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felt the need to mention scire facias in their debates or to refer to
it in the Constitution itself." 5 2 Had the Framers sought to describe the remedy appropriate to every constitutional right they
would have emerged with a swollen, inflexible code. Instead their
approach is illustrated by the response in the Virginia Ratification
Convention to anxious inquiries whether the words "trial by jury"
included the right to challenge jurors. Madison assured the
Ratifiers that "where a technical word was used all the incidents
belonging to it, necessarily attended it," an explanation in which
John Marshall, Judge Edmund Pendleton and Edmund Randolph
joined. 53
Of course, I did not insist on the "particular" remedy of scire
facias, described by Blackstone as appropriate not long before the
Convention. It was cited only to show that the common law afforded a remedy to effectuate the forfeiture. When the Framers
limited judicial tenure to "during good behavior" (many weeks before impeachment of the Supreme Court Justices was "mentioned"), they self-evidently did not intend that a judge who violated the condition should continue in office. Remedies, I showed,
were not frozen by the Constitution to those extant in 1787; if
scirefacias had become obsolete (not if Blackstone be credited), it
is open to Congress to provide another remedy. In addition, Marshall laid claim in Marbury v. Madison to the common law power to
54
fashion a remedy for every right.
Judge Kaufman finds a "gaping hole in [my] armor" in that
"there is no English case wherein a judge comparable to a federal
judge was removed in a judicial proceeding." 55 But for the fact
that this falls from the lips of a veteran judge this might be dismissed as the veriest ribbon-matching. He emphasizes, however,
that the simple scire facias proceeding was appropriate for "inferior officers" because "it is not necessary that they have the

52 Kaufman 694 (emphasis added). Chief Justice Marshall required a showing that "had

this particular case been suggested, the language would have been so varied, as to exclude
it." Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 644 (1819).
53 IMPEACHMENT 131 (citing 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 44, at 483-84, 497, 506-09, 520)
(emphasis added).
,5 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). Professor Jones referred to the "ingrained common law idea that there is no meaningful right if there is no effective remedy to vindicate
it." Jones, supra note 46, at 126. That we are merely dealing with the "remedy" is confirmed by Blackstone: "where the patentee hath done an act that amounts to a forfeiture
of the grant ... the remedy to repeal the patent is by writ ofscirefacias." 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
supra note 46, at 260-61 (emphasis added).
" Kaufman 694.
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independence expected of judges." 56 He rides his hobby horse
too hard. The "independence" of judges was late aflowering.
Since they were appointed "at pleasure" they could be unceremoniously removed, as when James I dumped Coke. 57 Historically the common law has grown by application of a principle to
analogous circumstances. Once judges were given "good behavior"
tenure it was natural to follow the removal procedure traditionally
associated with it. Consequently, when several rare "good behavior" high court appointees were threatened by arbitrary royal
removal, they insisted on the protection of a scire facias proceeding. One such was Sir John Walter, Chief Baron of the Exchequer, who refused in 1628 to surrender his patent of appointment on the ground "that he ought not to be removed without
a proceeding on a scire facias."58 In 1672, Sir John Archer, a
Justice of Common Pleas which ranked with King's Bench, "refused to surrender his patent without a scire facias."' " These
cases are dismissed by Judge Kaufman: the judges "made the argument only because they were then fending off removal by
another procedure," 6 0 in fact without any procedure whatever.
Why then did they not, instead of insisting on scire facias, invoke
impeachment, so dear to Judge Kaufman's heart, for that would
have been an even more plausible way (in his eyes) of "fending
off removal by another procedure." The fact that Archer and
Walter turned rather to scire facias testifies both that scire facias
was the familiar remedy and that judges justly preferred trial by
judges rather than by Parliament. When the Archer-Walter cases
were cited in 1692 before Chief Justice Holt and his associate Justices by Sergeant Levinz, himself a former Justice, Holt made the
significant remark that "our places as Judges are so settled, only
determinable upon misbehavior." 6 '
In another case, that of Sir Jonah Barrington, a judge of the
court of admiralty in Ireland, Lord Justice Denman, then a noted
advocate, arguing against removal by Address (without trial)

56 Id. at 695.
57 IMPEACHMENT 3 (citing 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 430-40 (2d,

ed. London 1937)).
'8 Id. at 128 (quoting Mcllwain, The Tenure of EnglishJudges, 7 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 217,
221 (1913)).
'9 Id. at 128-29 (quoting 83 Eng. Rep. 113 (1674)).
60 Kaufman 695.
61 IMPEACHMENT 129 (quoting Harcourt v. Fox,

720, 734 (1693)).

1 Show. K.B. 506, 539, 89 Eng. Rep.
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stated, "a scire facias could have been sued out to abrogate the
patent of office." 6 2 Denman, Judge Kaufman tells us, was attempting "to throw every obstacle in the way of a speedy decision." 63 Nevertheless, one who is familiar with the relation of
barristers to the high tribunals of England will not readily conclude that a noted advocate would put a frivolous alternative to
the tribunal or fail to be reprimanded if he did. Dilatory tactic or
not, it cannot be gainsaid that Denman once more preferred scire
facias to removal without trial.
This view of the law was summarized by Lord Chancellor
Erskine when, in the course of a debate in the House of Lords in
1806 upon whether to employ an Address for the removal of Justice Luke Fox of Common Pleas in Ireland, he asked, "Were their
Lordships afraid to trust the ordinary tribunals upon this occasion, to let the guilt or innocence of the honorable judge be decided ...upon a scirefacias to repeal the patent by which he held
his office?" 6 4 Once more, Judge Kaufman resorts to a hollow
distinction: "Berger excises the words 'by a jury' in reporting this
statement because they indicate Erskine's confusion about the nature
of scire facias. The writ was issuable in a civil proceeding, but, as
Erskine's complete speech makes clear, he was discussing the procedures employed in a criminal trial." 6 5 I "excised" the words
"by a jury" because they did not bear upon the distinction between trial by a court (be it civil or criminal) and removal by Parliament. To attribute to one of the greatest English judges "confusion" about whether scire facias, a familiar writ noted by
Blackstone, was civil or criminal borders on the laughable. What
matters is that Erskine once more preferred judicial removal to
removal by Parliament. 6 6 English judges regarded removal by
judges as a privilege-not an invasion of their "independence"to be preferred to trial by Parliament on impeachment or removal
without trial by Address.
62 Id. at 130 n.40 (quoting 24 Par. Deb. 966 (Hansard, 2d Ser. 1830)).
63 Kaufman 695 n.91. Despite Denman's appeal to scirefacias, Judge Kaufman argues

that the extension of scire facias for removal of judges is rebutted by Denman's assertion
that the "misconduct of Judges had frequently come under the consideration of Parliament." Id. at 695 (quoting 24 Par. Deb. 965 (2d Ser. 1830)). Notwithstanding, Denman
preferred scire facias.
64 IMPEACHMENT 130 (quoting 7 Par]. Deb. 770 (Ist Ser. 1806)).

6' Kaufman 697 (emphasis added).
66 Lord Campbell, himself a Lord Chancellor, and one who did not shrink from pointing out errors in the views of his predecessors, quoted the Erskine passage without comment, thus giving it credit. 6 J. CAMPBELL, LIvEs OF THE CHANCELLORS 559-60 (London
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Another unfounded charge of suppression is contained in
Judge Kaufman's treatment of my remark, "Eminent scholars,
among them Holdsworth, consider that removal of judges by scire
facias remains available in England." 6 7 He states:
Not surprisingly, though, [Berger] does not quote Holdsworth,
for that would undermine his case. Holdsworth merely wrote
that judges 'may, it is said,' be removed by several procedures
other than address: 'either by scire facias . .. criminal information, or impeachment, or by the exercise of the inquisitorial and
judicial jurisdiction vested in the House of Lords.' Holdsworth's
qualified statement of this view indicates that he was not vouching for its truth-and with good reason. Except for the mention of address, it was lifted almost verbatim from his only
source on the point: Denman's petition in the
House of Lords
68
for an accused judge, Sir Jonah Barrington.
Mark that one of the greatest English legal historians attaches
more weight to Denman than does Judge Kaufman. Nor did
Holdsworth have to "vouch for the truth" of the fact that judges
were removable by impeachment. Plainly Judge Kaufman grasps
at straws. Worse, he again accuses me of "excising," that is suppressing, allegedly unfavorable facts so that my "case" should not
be "undermined." What motivation would a long-time student of
legal history have for such suppression? Judge Kaufman's zeal for
"independence" has carried him too far.
Against Holdsworth, Judge Kaufman summons one of the
bright stars of legal history, Maitland, citing from his lectures on
constitutional law that "scire facias is not available." 69 But as
H.A.L. Fisher's preface states, this early work "does not claim to
be based upon original research; for much of his information
[Maitland] was confessedly content to draw upon the classical
text-books." 70 Compare with this the later, studied conclusion of
Charles McIlwain, in his essay on "The Tenure of English Judges"
(as reported by Judge Kaufman) that "English judges may be removed by scire facias, address or impeachment."17
Whatever the
views of the nineteenth century commentators, Blackstone, to

67 IMPEACHMENT

130.

68 Kaufman 697-98 (emphasis added).

19 Id. at 698 n.103.
70 IMPEACHMENT 130 n.42 (quoting Fisher, Preface to F.
vi (1911)).
71 Kaufman 698 n.103 (citing McIlwain, supra note 58, at 225).
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whom the colonists looked for a statement of the common law,
had not long before the Revolution declared that scire facias was
the "remedy" for forfeiture upon misbehavior.7 2
ACT OF SETTLEMENT

In 1700 the Act of Settlement gave judges good behavior tenure. Entitled "An Act for further limitation of the Crown," it
provided that "Judges Commissions be made Quamdiu se bene gesserint [as long as he shall behave himself well] ...but upon the
Address of both Houses of Parliament, it may be lawful to remove
them." 73 By this time "good behaviour" had an accepted connotation, associated with a judicial proceeding to declare the forfeiture for misbehavior. Bacon's Abridgment states that "If a Statute
make use of a Word the Meaning of which is well known at the
Common Law, the Word shall be understood in the same Sense it
was understood at the Common Law." 7 4 Consequently it needed
no Address procedure to effectuate a forfeiture for breach of
"good behaviour." Judge Kaufman argues, however, that removal
upon address was conditioned on misbehavior. 75 "But" is defined
as "except that," "with the exception of," so that notwithstanding
the tenure for good behavior judges could be removed by Address. 7 6 An English authority, Alpheus Todd, remarked that removal by Address, "is, in fact, a qualification of, or exception
from, the words creating a tenure during good behaviour, and
77
not an incident or legal consequence thereof."
To counter this analysis, Judge Kaufman invokes the Act of
1760 for "the most persuasive interpretation" of the Act of Settlement. After alluding to the benefits of "independency," the Act
made "further Provision for continuing Judges in the Enjoyment
of their Offices during their good Behaviour ...Provided always
...That it may be lawful for his Majesty ...to remove any Judge

72 3 W. BLACKSTONE,

supra note 46, at 260-61.

73 IMPEACHMENT 151 n.131 (emphasis added) (quoting Act of Settlement, 12 & 13 Wil-

liam II, c. 2, § 3 (1700)).
71 4 M. BACON, supra note 48, at 647 (Statute, section (I)(4)). For an early American case
to the same effect, see Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N.H. 53, 55 (1817).
75 Kaufman 696 n.94.
76 "But" indicates "that what follows is an exception to that which has gone before." In
re Naftzger's Estate, 24 Cal. 2d 595, 599, 150 P.2d 873, 875 (1944). See E.H. Rollins &
Sons v. Board of Comm'rs, 199 F. 71, 78 (8th Cir. 1912); Petition of Sullivan County R.R.,
76 N.H. 185, 186, 81 A. 473, 474 (1911).
77 IMPEACHMENT 88 n.162 (quoting A. TODD,supra note 50, at 729).
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78
or Judges upon the Address of both Houses of Parliament."
The "but" of 1700 was thus replaced by "Provided always," read
by Judge Kaufman as "standard language" to indicate "not an exception but a further elucidation." 7 ' A proviso, however, carves
out an exception from what precedes.8 0 Against this Judge
Kaufman argues that "[n]either judicial 'independency' nor good
behavior tenure could be regarded as more than hollow and pious
hopes if a judge could be removed at any time at the whim of
Crown and Parliament." 8 ' Yet he states that "[u]nlike impeachment, which required a trial and bore potentially heavy penalties,
address was merely a petition to the Crown for the removal of an
objectionable judge,"" 2 inferably without trial. The employment
of Address therefore indicates that judges were to remain "at the
whim" of Parliament. In truth, there is no evidence that Parliament shared Kaufman's attachment to "absolute independence," a
notion of the very recent past,8 3 or that it meant by the proviso
for Address to repudiate the association of that term with unrestricted removal,8 4 or, least of all, to replace the traditional judicial
trial for breach of "good behavior" by trial by impeachment,
surely a roundabout way of articulating that result. Justice Story
better understood the Act: "The object of the act of Parliament
was to secure the judges from removal at the mere pleasure of the
crown; but not to render them independent of the action of Parliament," 85 as the title of Act of 1700 confirms. Because removal by
76 Kaufman 696 n.94 (quoting Act of 1760, 1 Geo. 3, c. 23, § 2) (emphasis added).

71 Id. For this he merely cites other "provided always" in other sections of the Act, each
of which requires individual analysis.
80 With an air of stating settled law, Chief Justice Marshall held in 1825 that "[t~he
proviso is generally intended to restrain the enacting clause, and to except something
which would otherwise have been within it." Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1,
30 (1825). See also Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. 427, 435 (1922). In England it was held, "the
proviso, of which, according to the ordinary rules of construction, the effect must be to
except out of the earlier part of the section something which, but for the proviso, would be
within it." Duncan v. Dixon, 44 Ch. D. 211, 215, 62 L.T.R. (n.s.) 319, 321 (1890). This rule
of construction is confirmed by the facts hereinafter set forth.
81 Kaufman 696 n.94.
82 Id.

83 IMPEACHMENT 153-55. See Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of FederalJudges,
36 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 667 (1969).
84 According to Blackstone, the acts of Parliament were not subject to judicial control;
it was omnipotent. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 46, at 91. See Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 531 (1884) ("[N]otwithstanding what was attributed to Lord Coke in Bonham's
Case, ... the omnipotence of Parliament over the common law was absolute, even against
common right and reason. The actual and practical security for English liberty against
legislative tyranny was the power of a free public opinion represented by the Commons.")
85 IMPEACHMENT 151 n.133 (quoting 2 J. STORY, supra note 46, at § 1623).
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Address required no trial, a motion to incorporate the 1760 proviso
in the Constitution was rejected by the Framers. Gouverneur
Morris "thought it a contradiction in terms to say that the Judges
should hold their offices during good behavior, and yet be removeable without a trial ... it was fundamentally wrong to subject
86
Judges to so arbitrary an authority."
Another analytical flaw is exhibited by Judge Kaufman's reliance on a non-judicial interpretation in 1930 of the Consolida"tion Act of 1925-judges of the High Court "shall hold their offices during good behaviour subject to a power of removal ... on
an address"-to the effect that such a judge "is only removable on
an address to the Crown." 8 7 This interpretation would attribute
to Parliament renunciation of its power of impeachment, a renunciation which would leave it powerless to remove objectionable
judges, because as McIlwain points out, no Act "forces the king to
remove." 88 Thus this reading converts an Act designed to shelter
judges from royal removal into royal authority to continue objectionable judges in office against the will of Parliament. It was precisely this power, to remove those whom the king sought to shelter, for which Parliament had fought. 89 Edmund Burke, 90 Lord
Chancellor Erskine, Holdsworth and McIlwain consider that the
other means of removal-impeachment, scire facias-remain, and
such authorities are not to be laughed out of court.
A reading more respectful of the syntax of the Act and the
history of its terms is that of R.M. Jackson: "the power to remove
[judges] after an address is additional to the common law. It is a

s6 2 M.

FARRAND,

supra note 44, at 428. The separation between judicial removal on

breach of "good behavior" and removal by address is clearly marked in the Maryland Con-

stitution of 1776: "Judges shall be removed for misbehavior, on conviction in a court of
law, and may be removed by the Governor, upon the address of the General Assembly."
IMPEACHMENT 152 n.137 (quoting I B. POORE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITuTIoNs 819
(1877)) (emphasis added). So too, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided, "All
judicial ... officers shall hold their offices during good behavior ... Provided, nevertheless,
The governor ... may remove them upon the address of both houses of the legislature,"
i.e., regardless of good behavior. Id. at 152 n.137 (quoting I B. POORtE, supra at 968). These
statutes constitute a colonial gloss upon the Acts of 1700 and 1760.
8' Kaufman 696 n.94 (emphasis added). Mark the progression from "but" through
"provided that" to "subject to."
83 IMPEACHMENT 151 (citing McIlwain, supra note 58, at 226).
89 Id. at 71-72. The fear of "favorites" was vigorously expressed in the Convention. See
discussion in id. at 140. Judge Kaufman notices that "the address procedure, as a limitation
on the power of the monarch to remove disfavored judges, stands in contrast to impeachment, which allowed Parliament to remove the King's favorites." Kaufman 696 n.94.
90 IMPEACHMENT 151 n.132 (citing 2 A. TODD, supra note 50, at 730).
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principle of construction that judicial process is not abolished except by clear words... ." 91 Our own Supreme Court declined to
construe the all-inclusive "every person" to strike down an established judicial immunity in the absence of specific language indicating such an intention. 92 The view that the Act of Settlement
provided both for judicial trial for misbehavior and unqualified
removal on Address (implicit in Gouverneur Morris' statement) is
spelled out in the Maryland Constitution of 1776, patently modeled on the Act: "Judges shall be removed for misbehavior, on
conviction in a court of law, and may be removed by the Governor
[without reference to misbehavior] upon the address of the General Assembly." 93 If the argument that removal by Address
excluded removal for misbehavior by judges fails, and this though
both provisions are contained in the same section of the Act, the
case for the exclusivity of impeachment is even weaker, for the
"good behavior" and impeachment provisions were in quite different Articles and temporally separated.
AMERICAN MATERIALS

The starting point for analysis is that the Constitutional
Framers employed long-established technical terms of widely disparate provenance and located them in two separate Articles.
Article III conditioned judicial tenure "on good behavior"; there
it appeared almost from the beginning of the Convention, May
29th, long before impeachment of the Justices was mentioned.9 4
The provision for impeachment for "high crimes and misdemeanors," chosen precisely because those words had a "technical;" "limited" meaning, 95 was placed in Article II, the Executive
Article, for the simple reason that almost all of the impeachment
debate centered on the President. As said by Hamilton, both the
English and several state constitutions "seem to have regarded the
practice of impeachments as a bridle in the hands of the legislative body upon the executive servants of the government. Is not
this the true light in which it ought to be regarded?" 96 When at

91 Id. (citing R.M. JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 289 n.I (5th ed.

1967)).
92 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967).
9n I B. POORE, supra note 86, at 819.
See 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 44, at 21; 2 id. at 367.
95 See 2 id. at 443.
98 THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (A. Hamilton), at 425 (Mod. Lib. Ed. 1937).
14
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last, on August 20th, the Committee of Five was directed to report "a mode for trying the supreme Judges in case of impeachment," no mention was made of impeachment of "inferior"
judges.9 7 Judge Kaufman himself notes English authority held
that "the judges of our inferior courts' who had been placed 'under the general supervision of the Queen's Bench' might be removed at common law or by statute for misbehavior." 9 The distinction between the "superior judges" and "the lower ranks of
the judiciary," stressed by Judge Kaufman, 99 was thus implicitly
drawn by the Convention. And the absence of "mention" (of the
"lower courts") upon which Judge Kaufman often relies for
proof,100 justifies the inference that they at least were to be removed in the traditional way by judges for breach of good behavior under Article III.
Only at the last minute were the words "vice-President and
other Civil officers" added to Article II, an afterthought as it
were. " ' So far as the text goes-Judge Kaufman's fellow activists have consigned the "legislative intention" to deepest
limbo,' 0 2 and one of them insists that "the most important datum
97 IMPEACHMENT 146 (citing 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 44, at 337).

98 Kaufman 698 n.104. King's Bench, said Bacon's Abridgment, "exercises a
Superintendency over all inferior Courts, and may grant an Attachment against the Judges
of such
Courts for oppressive, unjust or irregular Practice ... " IMPEACHMENT 66 (quoting
3 M.
BACON, supra note 48, at 744).
99 Kaufman 698 n. 104. Judge Kaufman argues that an "English judge comparable
to a
federal judge could [not] have been removed by scirefacias proceedings," that 'judges
cannot ... be easily analogized to inferior officers." Kaufman 698, 695. Judges of
the English
high courts thought othervise. See text accompanying notes 58-66 supra.
The Framers
labelled the lower courts the "inferior" courts and left their creation and jurisdiction
in the
hands of Congress, testimony that the Framers did not share Judge Kaufman's
awed regard for the "inferior" federal judges. Indeed Hamilton assured them that of
the three
departments "the judiciary is next to nothing." THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A.
Hamilton), at
504 (Mod. Lib. Ed. 1937).
100 Thus Judge Kaufman argues, "The very absence
of a removal provision in Article
III indicates that the Framers must have implied a reference to the impeachment
clauses
and thereby intended that bad behavior be dealt with exclusively by impeachment."
Kaufman 692. "The very absence" of a reference to impeachment of "inferior"
judges when
impeachment of the "supreme Judges" was mentioned even more forcibly indicates
that
the removal of "inferior" judges was to "be dealt with" under Article III for
breach of
"good behavior." His reliance on the Framer's silence is pointed up
by his dismissal of an
express statutory provision for penalties on the ground that "there was no mention
in either
House of the bribery penalties, constituting a brief portion of a long statute
aimed at
punishing crimes against the United States." Id. at 702 n. 127. See text accompanying
notes
143-45 infra.
0 IMPEACHMENT 147 (citing 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 44, at 552).
102 See Alfange, On JudicialPolicymaking and Constitutional
Change: Another Look at the
"OriginalIntent" Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 603
(1978);
Murphy, Book Review, 87 YALE L.J. 1652 (1978).
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bearing on what was intended is the constitutional language itself"' 0 3
the association of "President, Vice President and other civil officers" in the Executive article permits the inference, under the
maxim noscitur a sociis ("a word is known by the company it
keeps"),' 0 4 that those words referred to officers of the Executive
Department. A commentator often quoted by Judge Kaufman,
observed that "[tihere is a legitimate textual question whether
judges were included in the impeachment provisions of Article
II." 15
Moreover, impeachment, as the Founders knew, proceeded against great offenders for "great and dangerous offenses"; 106 in the words of Judge Kaufman, it is "a drastic remedy, essential but dangerous, to be used only in imperative
cases," ' 0 7 a category that ill fits the removal of a sordid district
judge for misconduct. In the North Carolina Ratification Convention, Archibald Maclaine rejected the notion "that petty officers
might be impeached... [I]mpeachments cannot extend to inferior officers of the United States." 108 To be sure, Judge
Kaufman entertains a more exalted view of the "inferior" courts,
but when that is balanced against the tremendous problems from
which impeachment would divert the Congress, it is difficult to
conclude that the Framers meant the wheels of Congress to grind

103 Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 418 (1978)
(emphasis in original).
104 Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961). For reliance on such a
maxim by a prefervid activist, see C. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 36 (1974).
105 Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English and American Precedents,

1969 Sup. CT. REv. 135, 151. Against this Judge Kaufman argues, "It has long been settled
that federal judges are 'Civil Officers' within the meaning of this clause," Kaufman 691,
citing a "dictum" in Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 316 (1903). Since when do
dicta "settle" issues? See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821), quoted at
text accompanying note 137 infra.
106 IMPEACHMENT 86 (quoting 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 44, at 550).
107 Kaufman 705. When Judge Kaufman asks how his opponents can "ignore two
hundred years of history," (id. at 693), he overlooks that the history of impeachment is tied
to "high crimes and misdemeanors," not to breaches of "good behavior," a quite different
category; that impeachment was the medium for removal of the highest officials, e.g., the
Earl of Strafford, the Duke of Suffolk, the Duke of Buckingham, not lower tier corrupzionists. See IMPEACHMENT 30-40, 67-69. That is why we experience no "difficulty [in] explaining Alexander Hamilton's statement that trial for removal from office on the grave
charges specified- by the impeachment clauses must be held before the Senate, because of
'[t]he awful discretion, which a court of impeachment must necessarily have, to doom to
honor or to infamy the most confidential and the most distinguished characters of the community."' Kaufman 693-94 (emphasis added). "Awful discretion" is involved in removing a
President Andrew Johnson or Richard Nixon, but it is absurd to insist that it is likewise
involved in removing obscure corruptionists.
'0s IMPEACHMENT 162-63 (quoting 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 44, at 70).
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to a halt in order to oust a judge soiled by corruption or incapacitated by senility.
The weightiest evidence of the Framer's original intention
must be sought in the records of the Convention. There, but for
the last-minute reference to the impeachment of the "Supreme
judges," there was no reference to the removal of the inferior
judges nor to exclusion of the traditional removal by judges for
breaches of good behavior. The remarks before and after the
Convention need to be weighed against the Framers' awareness
that the technical common law terms they employed carried with
them their common law connotations. Thus, when they employed
"treason" they carefully redefined it to avoid the excesses of English history.' 0 9 Noting that so defined treason would not include
subversion of the State-the cardinal impeachable offense-the
words "high crimes and misdemeanors" were added, after canvassing a number of alternatives, because they had a "technical", "limited" meaning. 1 10 John Dickinson sought for the meaning of
"ex post facto" in Blackstone and concluded that to expand it
beyond criminal cases would require "some further provision."'
By the same token, to curtail the traditional judicial
remedy for breach of good behavior would therefore require
some redefinition. The test, articulated by Chief Justice Marshall,
is a showing that had "this particular case been suggested, the
language would have been so varied as to exclude it.""' No
evidence remotedly suggesting that the Framers would have rejected judicial removal of the "inferior" judges is to be found in
the records of the Convention; their respect for the common law
meaning of the terms argues against it.
One other fact needs to be noted: the Framers did not share
Judge Kaufman's devotion to "absolute independence." So, James
Wilson, next to Madison the chief architect of the Constitution,
declared, "The independency of each power consists in this, that
its proceedings ... should be free from the remotest influence...
of either of the other two powers. But further than this, the independency of each power ought not to extend."" 3 Hamilton
wrote, "The standard of good behavior.., is an excellent barrier
109

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, para. 1.

110 IMPEACHMENT 86-87 (citing 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 44, at 550); see also notes 43-44

and accompanying text supra.
111 2 M. FARRAND, -supranote 44, at 448-49; see also notes 91-92 supra.
112Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 644 (1819).
"3

1 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 299 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
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to the despotism of the prince" and "to the encroachments and
oppressions of the representative body," 114 not, be it noted, to
removal of judges by judges. One of the earliest commentators on
the Constitution, Judge St. George Tucker of the Virginia Court
of Appeals, wrote that the "absolute independence of the
judiciary for which we contend is ... an independence of the
other co-ordinate branches of the government ... who have the
custody of the purse and sword .
," 115 Judge Kaufman cites no

English or American constitutional source for the proposition that
"it is equally essential to protect the independence of the individual judge, even from incursions by other judges." 116 The English practice, as we have seen, was to the contrary. Hamilton
himself considered that "all impeachments" should be tried by "a
Court."

117

And at one stage the Convention referred to the

Committee on Detail a resolution that "[i]mpeachments shall be
...before the Senate and the judges of the federeal [sic] judicial
court," 118 thereby indicating that impairment of "collegiality"
played no part in their thinking.
The evidence most favorable to the Kaufman view is Rufus
King's statement that "the Judiciary hold their places not for a
limited time, but during good behaviour. It is necessary therefore
that a forum should be established for trying misbehaviour. Was
the Executive to hold his place during good behaviour? ... He

ought not to be impeachable unless he hold his office during
good behaviour .... 119 But King's attempt to link impeachment
to good behavior tenure met with no favor. In the upshot the
"forum" was not to "try misbehavior" but "high crimes and misdemeanors," a quite different standard. The pitfalls of reliance on
such desultory remarks are illustrated by statements on the same
day by Gouverneur Morris and George Mason that impeachment
was designed to punish "criminal act[s]." 120 The final structure
of the impeachment provisions separated removal for impeachable offenses from indictment for the crime. 12 Then too Madison
urged on the same day that impeachment should comprehend

114

THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton), at 503 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).

IMPEACHMENT 155 n.149 (quoting St. G. Tucker, supra note 47, at 359).
Kaufman 713.
117 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 44, at 292.
118 2 id. at 136.
119 2 id. at 66-67.
120 2 id. at 64-65.
121See IMPEACHMENT 79.
11
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"incapacity ... of the chief Magistrate," and Morris added that
"incapacity" was among the "causes of impeachment," 122 a view
that finds no warrant in the impeachment trials for "high crimes
and misdemeanors," adopted by the Framers because of its "limited" nature. And in The Federalist, Hamilton rejected "incapacity" as a basis for impeachment because the task of fixing the
bounds of inability "would much oftener give scope to personal
and party attachments and enmities than advance the interests of
justice or the public good." 123 Who is to be given greater
credence- Madison and Morris or Hamilton? In electing "high
crimes and misdemeanors" because of its "technical" meaning, I
suggest, the Framers chose to rely on the English practice rather
than the views earlier expressed by individual Framers. 1 24 Since
the Framers singled out the "Supreme Judges" for impeachment
it is reasonable to infer that removal of "inferior" judges was left
to forfeiture under Article III. If impeachment was available, it
was when their breaches rose to the level of "great offenses" and
Congress chose to employ impeachment as a "supplementary remedy" because the Judiciary neglected to cleanse its own house.
"The Framers," Judge Kaufman writes, "believed that the tenure of judges should be established in terms of good behavior
and the remedy for a breach should be impeachment," referring
to "an essay published in 1776" by John Adams, and "quoted ver122 2 M. FARRAND,

supra note 44,

at 65, 69.
No. 79 (A. Hamilton), at 514 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
The Framers' respect for these technical terms (see text accompanying notes 43-44

123 THE FEDERALIST
124

supra), undermines Judge Kaufman's statement that "[t]he American draftsmen were not
concerned with whether tenure during good behavior had taken on a technical meaning in
England ....
" Kaufman 700. So too, it vitiates his statement that "[j]udicial tenure during
good behavior was widely adopted in America not because it indicated the possibilities of
unspoken methods of removal but, as the Adams statement demonstrates, because it was
this formulation that had guaranteed English judges life tenure since the beginning of the
century." Id. And he states, "the use of 'good behavior' in Article III was meant to protect
tenure, not to categorize grounds for removal." Id. at 701 n.123. The divorce between
tenure and its forfeiture is a discovery of Judge Kaufman's, without roots in English law.
In 1862, the English Crown law officers confirmed the appeals of Justices Archer and
Walter to scirefadas, holding with reference to judicial "good behaviour" tenure that "when
a public office is held during good behaviour, a power [of removal for misbehavior] must
exist somewhere; and when it is put in force, the tenure of the office is not thereby
abridged, but it is forfeited and declared vacant for non-performance of the condition on
which it was originally conferred." IMPEACHMENT 127 n.25 (quoting 2 A. TODD, supra note
50, at 728) (emphasis added). Never was impeachment the "method" of forfeiture. For the
"categories" of "misbehavior" resort must be had, as in the case of "high crimes and misdemeanors," to English practice. In 1768 Josiah Quincy, Sr., had directed attention to the
scope of impeachment in England in a letter to the Boston Gazette. IMPEACHMENT 143 n.97
(citing QuiNcY's MAss. RzP. 580-84 (Boston 1865)).
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batim ... in a letter by Thomas Jefferson the same year." 12 5 Jefferson came to take a broader view, writing in 1816 (after the
abortive Chase impeachment) that judges "are irremovable, but by
their own body, for any depravities of conduct," 126 being confirmed
in this in 1825 by a renowned commentator on constitutional law,
William Rawle. 1 27 Adams, of course, was not a "Framer," being,
like Jefferson, absent on a diplomatic mission during the sessions
of the Convention. 1 28 Had Adams consulted Blackstone he
would have learned that a forfeiture for breach of "good behavior" was declared on a writ of scire facias. The State Trials
which Adams invoked for impeachment of judges were for "high
crimes and misdemeanors," not breaches of "good behavior." A
clue to the potential influence of such remarks is furnished by the
fact that the Convention turned to English practice rather than to
12 9
existing State constitutions for light.
Next Judge Kaufman relies on Hamilton's statement in The
Federalist, No. 79: judges "are liable to be impeached for malconduct by the House of Representatives, and tried by the Senate.... This is the only provision on the point which is consist125 Kaufman 699 n. 111. Adams, who had just discovered the State Trials (IMPEACHMENT
142-43 (citing 2 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 329-30 (Boston 1850))), but had not noticed that
they proceeded for "high crimes and misdemeanors," wrote: "The judges ... should hold
estates for life ...

their commissions should be during good behavior ....

For mis-

behavior, the grand inquest of the colony ... should impeach them .... " Kaufman 699.
126 IMPEACHMENT 155 n.150 (quoting 15 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 34 (Mem. ed.

1905) (emphasis added)).
127 Rawle wrote that, in England, "Judges are held liable to trial for every offense before.
their brethren ....

IMPEACHMENT 155 n.150 (quoting W. RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTI-

TUTION 214 (2d ed. 1829)).
228

A similar slipshod remark is Judge Kaufman's statement that "The Jeffersonian

Congress, so eager to remove Federalists from the bench, wasted much effort in the cases
of John Pickering and Samuel Chase if, instead of twice running the gauntlet of impeachment, it might have utilized a more streamlined and far simpler procedure to accomplish
the same result." Kaufman 694. When Jefferson became President, his biographer, Dumas
Malone, observed, "the federal judiciary," one hundred per cent Federalist, amounted to
"an arm of the party." 4 D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND His TIME 114 (1970). In fact, the
judiciary often made intemperate attacks oil the Jeffersonians (IMPEACHMENT 155-56 (citing
1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 273-79 (1922)); see D.
MALONE, supra, at 464-68), so they were little likely to remove one of their own on complaints from the Jeffersonians.
Another such slip is Judge Kaufman's statement that "[tihe logical flaws in Berger's
gap theory" are illustrated by the fact that "the sole penalties" on impeachment "are removal and disqualification from office." How, he argues, "can one reasonably contend that
those precise penalties may be imposed for a lesser offense ... " Kaufman 693 (emphasis
added). I have never contended that removal for breach of "good behavior" can be accompanied by "disqualification from office." His indictment was too hastily drawn.
129 IMPEACHMENT 114 n.101 (citing 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 44, at 428-29).
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ent with the necessary independence of the judicial character." 13 0 Having in mind that the Convention had rejected removal
by address, this remark may be construed to refer to and rule
out such removal. For Hamilton sought to make judges independent of the other branches, not of judges.1 3 1 Moreover, he
immediately made his "only" subject to an exception: "insanity,
without any formal or express provision, may be safely pronounced to be a virtual disqualification." 132 Why should an exception for the unmentioned "insanity" rise higher than an exception, to use his own words, for the explicit "standard of good
behavior,"' 3 3 a standard different from that of "high crimes and
misdemeanors"? The House speedily approved another exception,
removal by the President of his subordinates, of which Judge
Kaufman says, "Of course, it is perfectly fitting for the President
to remove his own executive subordinates without invoking the
impeachment process ... . 134 Why "of course"? Executive subordinates squarely fit within the all inclusive "all civil officers" of
Article II, whereas there is at least a doubt whether the Article III
judges, covered by the "standard of good behavior" were meant to
fit within the terms of Article II. Such exceptions as those of
Judge Kaufman are dictated by taste rather than irrefragable
logic. It is easier to recognize an "exception" for the established
forfeiture proceeding that was a time-honored concomitant of the
technical term "good behavior" than to remove Executive subordinates from "all civil officers."
Judge Kaufman also draws on the "removal" debate in the
First Congress, where a sharply divided House gratuitously expressing its views as to the President's power vis-a-vis the Senate,

Kaufman 702.
131See text accompanying notes 96 & 114 supra. Judge Kaufman reminds us that "one of
the grievances against George III listed in the Declaration of Independence was: 'He has
made Judges dependent on his Will alone .........
therefore, they provided ... that they
should continue in office 'during good Behaviour."' Kaufman 690-91.
The view that "the impeachment clauses were meant as limitations only on Congress,"
Judge Kaufman argues, is vitiated by the fact that the power to try impeachment was
vested in the Senate rather than the Court. Kaufman 693 n.76. But, as Hamilton
explained, the Framers doubted whether the Supreme Court would "be endowed with so
eminent a portion of fortitude" as to "bridle" the "executive servants of the government."
THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (A. Hamilton), at 425 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). Then too, the impeachment clause constituted an exception from the separation of powers. See IMPEACH130

MENT 118 n.73.
132 THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (A. Hamilton), at 514 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
133
134

Id. No. 78, at 503.
Kaufman 692.
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considered whether his power of appointment carried with it the
power of removal, leading to the argument that since the Senate
shared the one it should participate in the other. 135 The remarks
upon which Judge Kaufman relies are admittedly "somewhat
tangential to the issue debated." The focus of the debate was on
removal by the President of his subordinates, not on the exclusivity of impeachment of judges. Kaufman defends these remarks
because they are "unambiguous." 136 A dictum is not the less a
dictum because stated "unambiguously"; and as Chief Justice
Marshall held, dicta "ought not to control the judgment in a
subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision ...[because] their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated." 137 Speaking on behalf of the President's removal power, "Madison ... stated that impeachment
could not be the exclusive means for removing subordinate
officers, but added that this 'might be the case' 'as applied to
Judges.' "138 Opponents were asking whether the President could
also remove judges, and the thrust of the debate is disclosed by
the reply of Roger Sherman, a Framer: "the power which appoints
can also remove, unless there are express exceptions made. Now the
power which appoints the judges cannot displace them, because
there is a constitutional restriction [good behavior] in their
favor."' 3 9 Michael Stone chimed in that good behavior limited
"the exercise of the power which appoints. It is thus in the case of
the judges."' 40 It is in this context that one must read the remark by Abraham Baldwin: "The judges are appointed by the
President but they are removable only by impeachment ....The
President has no agency in the removal."' 14 ' Elias Boudinot, the
erstwhile President of the Continental Congress, was closer to the
mark in the First Congress: "it is nowhere said that officers shall
never be removed but by impeachment; but it says they shall be

13'The "removal" debate is discussed in R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT
146-49 (1969).
136 Kaufman 702 n.126.
137 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821).
13' Kaufman 692 n.74 (emphasis added).
139 IMPEACHMENT 149 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 510 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789) (print
bearing running title "History of Congress")) (emphasis added).
140 Id. (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 512 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789) (print bearing running title "History of Congress")) (emphasis added).
141 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 557 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789) (print bearing running title "History of Congress"). See Kaufman 702 n.126.
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removed on impeachment."' 1 42 It is not a little remarkable that
Judge Kaufman, who dismisses the pertinent demands of Justices
Archer, Walter, and of Denman on behalf of Justice Barrington,
for judicial trial because they sought to avoid a legislative proceeding, should here pitch his case on sheer dicta.
Such dicta were ignored by the First Congress when it was
confronted by an actual case, and by its action repudiated the several suggestions that impeachment was exclusive. In the Act of
1790 the First Congress provided that upon conviction in court
for bribery a judge shall "forever be disqualified to hold any office." 143 Since the impeachment clause provides for removal and
disqualification upon impeachment and conviction, as Judge Kaufman recognizes, 14 4 the Act is unconstitutional if the clause indeed
provides the "exclusive" method of disqualification. The First
Congress, in which sat many Framers and Ratifiers, is scarcely to
be charged with misconstruing the Constitution. Hence the 1790
statute must be recognized as a weighty construction that the impeachment clause does not provide the "only" means for the disqualification of judges. As with "disqualification," so with "removal," for the two stand on a par in the impeachment clause.
What the First Congress did when it had to deal with the "disqualification" of judges thus speaks against reliance upon some earlier
utterances by its members when the removal of judges was not
involved. To dispose of the 1790 Act Judge Kaufman resorts to a
truly marvelous argument: the bribery provision was "a brief portion of a long statute" and "there was no mention in either House
of the bribery penalties....
,
Thus silence in the debates
about an express statutory provision deprives it of effect, an original contribution to the uses of legislative history!
1412IMPEACHMENT 138 n.73 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG.

486-87 (Gales & Seaton eds.

1789) (print bearing running title "History of Congress")) (emphasis added).
143 Id. at 150 (quoting An Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes against the United
States, ch. 9, § 21, 1 Stat. 117 (1790)).
144 Kaufman 693.
145 Id. at 702 n.127 (emphasis added). Judge Kaufman also relies on Burton v. United
States, 202 U.S. 344, 369-70 (1906), which considered a statute rendering a senator convicted of taking a bribe "forever hereafter incapable" of holding any office under the United
States. "The statute, the court said, did not of its own force remove Burton from
office, for that remained the sole prerogative of the Senate under Article I, § 5." Kaufman
693 n.75. This had no reference to impeachment under Article II, § 4, but to the powers
of each House to judge the "qualifications of its own members"; only the Senate could
"expel its members." Moreover, the Court held, Senators are "chosen by state legislature,
and cannot properly be said to hold their places 'under the Government of the United
States,'" which cannot be said of federal judges.
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For Judge Kaufman "the explanation [in 1802] by Gouverneur Morris erases doubt that impeachment was the intended remedy:
'Misbehaviour is not a term known in our law; the idea is expressed by the word misdemeanor; which word is in the clause
respecting impeachments. Taking, therefore, the two together,
and speaking plain old English, the Constitution says: "The
judges shall hold their offices so long as they demean themselves well; but if they shall misdemean, if they shall, on impeachment, be convicted of misdemeanor, they shall be removed."'" 146
To my comment that "Morris was incorrect in claiming that the
term misbehavior was unknown to the American law, because two
of the early state constitutions expressly made misbehavior
triable"-let alone that Article III refers not to "misbehaviour"
but to "good behavior," a common law term of established
meaning-Judge Kaufman responds that this is irrelevant. 147 Yet
those state consitutions were before the Convention; Morris' remark was made 15 years later. Judge Kaufman maintains, however, that Morris was "the most important member of the Committee on Style and Revision," and that he was therefore best
"qualified to define precisely the meaning" of the constitutional
terms. 48 But he was not entitled to define the meaning of those
terms long after the Convention completed its labors, when his
"revision" could no longer be submitted for its approval.
The "Committee of Style," as its name suggests, was appointed "to revise the style of and arrange the articles agreed to by
the House,"' 49 not by defining to make changes of substance. Can
Morris' mistaken and after-the-fact "revision," for instance, alter
the meaning of "high crimes and misdemeanors" as he purports
to do? "High crimes and misdemeanors," as I have shown, meant

146 Kaufman 701 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). "Misdemean" and "misbehave"

were sometimes interchangeable terms-identified for purpose of "good behavior"-but it
does not follow that "misbehavior" was equated with "misdemeanor"; rather "misbehave"
and "misdemean" illustrate the familiar fact that the same word may have different meanings in different contexts. See IMPEACHMENT 161; text accompanying notes 150-52 infra.
147 Kaufman 701.
148 Id. (emphasis added).
149 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 44 at 547 (emphasis added). In April 1831, Madison wrote
that "thefinish given to the style and arrangement of the Constitution fairly belongs to the
pen of Mr. Morris." C. VAN DOREN, THE GREAT REHEARSAL 160 (1948) (emphasis in original). See Berger, supra note 135, at 220-21.
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"and High Misdemeanors," a term peculiar to impeachment, 150
meaning political crimes against the State as distinguished from
,'misdemeanors" which appeared long after in criminal law to
identify private wrongs.' 5 1 "High Misdemeanors" were never
confused with "misdemeanors" in English law, and but for a few
statutes directed at political crimes, the term found no place in
American criminal law.15 2 The terms were chosen by the Framers precisely because they were not "so vague" as "maladministration" and had a limited, technical meaning. 5 3 Judge Kaufman
would make impeachment turn on commission of a crime, exactly
as Richard Nixon sought to do. True it is that the Framers did
not ascribe "a well-defined technical meaning to the standard
'good behavior,' "'
but neither did they do so with "habeas corpus" and other common law terms. But they recognized that
"treason," "ex post facto" had technical meanings; in another context the Convention struck out the word "high misdemeanor", "it
being doubtful whether 'high misdemeanor' had not a technical
meaning too limited ... . ,,55 No occasion arose similarly to underscore the technical meaning of "good behavior." Now, through
the medium of Morris' muddled remarks, Judge Kaufman would
empty the Framers' reliance on technical terms.
A far better understanding of textual differentiation was
exhibited in the same year, 1802, by Senator David Stone: Judges,
he declared,
doubtless shall, (as against the President's power to retain them
in office,) ...be removed from office by impeachment and
conviction; but it does not follow that they might not be removed by other means. They shall hold their offices during
good behaviour, and they shall be removed from office upon
impeachment and conviction of treason, bribery, and other
high crimes and misdemeanors. If the words, impeachment of

150
'5'
152

IMPEACHMENT 74 n.108.
See id. at 61-63.
See, e.g., Act of June 5, 1794, 3d Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 50, § 1, 1 Stat. 381-82 (1845)

(acceptance by a citizen of a commission to serve a foreign state); Act of June 14, 1798, 5th
Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1845) (unlawful combination to oppose measures of
government); Act of Jan. 30, 1799, 5th Cong., 3d Sess., ch. I, 1 Stat. 613 (1845) (correspondence by citizens with a foreign government in order to influence measures in dispute
with the United States); Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 28 U.S.C. 454 (1976) (practice of
law by a judge).
'sn IMPEACHMENT 74 (citing 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 44, at 65, 550).
1S4 Kaufman 701.
155 IMPEACHMENT 74 (quoting 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 44, at 443).
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high crimes and misdemeanors, be understood according to any
construction of them hitherto received and established, it will
be found, that although a judge, guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors, is always guilty of misbehaviour in office, yet that
of the various species of misbehaviour in office, which may render it exceedingly improper that a judge should continue in
office, many of them are neither treason, nor bribery, nor can
they be properly dignified by the appellation of high crimes
and misdemeanors; and for the impeachment of which no precedent can be found; nor would the words of the Constitution
justify such impeachment.
To what source, then, shall we resort for a knowledge of
what constitutes this thing, called misbehaviour in office? The
Constitution, surely, did not intend that a circumstance so important as the tenure by which the judges hold their offices,
should be incapable of being ascertained. Their misbehaviour
certainly is not an impeachable offense; still it is the ground
upon which the judges are to be removed from office. The
process of impeachment, therefore, cannot be the only one by
which the judges may be removed from office, under, and according to the Constitution. I take it, therefore, to be a thing
undeniable, that there resides somewhere in the Government a
power to declare what shall amount to misbehaviour in office, by
the judges, and to remove them from office for the same, without impeachment. 5 "
My regard for the intention of the Framers is much greater
than that of the activists, with whom Judge Kaufman apparently
identifies himself. But it is a regard for the clearly discernible,
unmistakable original intention, not for a history that is inconclusive, tangential and muddled. Inconclusive history, in my judgment, cannot overcome the Framers' choice of common law terms
of settled attributes.
JUDICIAL RULE BY DIVINE RIGHT

"Independence," states Judge Kaufman, "becomes more-not
less--critical as the issues faced by the courts expand." 15 7 But it
is the courts that have "expanded" their jurisdiction, intruding
156 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 72-73 (1802). Stone mistakenly concluded that "[tihe Constitu-

tion does not prohibit their removal by the Legislature," (id. at 73), which is true enough if
one seeks for an express prohibition. But impeachment is an exception from the separation
of powers (see IMPEACHMENT 118 n.73); in other respects his analysis responds to the historical facts.
157 Kaufman 682.
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into legislative policymaking and undertaking constitutional revision. It is precisely this unremitting and unauthorized expansion
of judicial governance that counsels us to reject the claim to "absolute" independence. For uncircumscribed power is alien to our
democratic system. Apparently oblivious to the ongoing debate
whether the powers exercised by the courts under the fourteenth
amendment exceed its grants, 1 58 Judge Kaufman repeatedly assumes the answer. Thus, "Federal judges have been increasingly
entrusted with basic and vital questions regarding the structure of
our society and its allocation of wealth and power, ranging from
the admissions policy of a California medical school ... to governmental funding for abortions ... ." 119 He acknowledges that
until modern times the most ... controversial exercises of judi-

cial power were negative actions limiting the scope of government.... In the law few decades the courts have given broad
construction to affirmative personal rights and manifested an
increased willingness to articulate and implement new ones. The
roll call of causes dealt with by the judiciary sounds like a litany
of the most vexing questions in current American political history: racial discrimination and segregation, school admissions
and affirmative action, busing .... 160
This, he notes, represents a "profound evolution in the role of the
judiciary." 161 Others have called it a "revolution."' 62 Let a fellow activist, Professor Louis Lusky, who defends the change, describe it: "[T]he Court's new and grander conception of its own

"' See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 202-03 (1970) (dissenting opinion, Harlan, J.);
R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1977); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1 (1971); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975). A
number of reviewers state that GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra, raises serious questions
that call for an answer. Perry, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 685 (1978); Kommers, REVIEW OF PouTICS, July 1978, at 407; Beloff, THE TIMES (London), HIGHER EDUC. SuPP. Apr. 7, 1978,

II; Kay, 10 CONN. L. REv. 801 (1978).
Kaufman 681 (emphasis added).
Id. at 684-85 (emphasis added). Judge Kaufman recognizes that a judge "cannot
reach out like a legislator to resolve pressing social issues." Id. at 707.
161

Id.

162

Alfred Kelly, an admirer of the Warren Court, wrote that the Court was determined

at 688.

"to carry through a constitutional egalitarian revolution." Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit
Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 119, 158. Former Justice Abe Fortas said, "It is fascinating,
although disconcerting to some, that the first and fundamental breakthrough in various
categories of revolutionary progress has been made by the courts .... " Fortas, Equal
Rights-For Whom?, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 5, 1967, at 4. Where is the warrant for a "revolution" by
judges?
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place in the governmental scheme" rests on "two basic shifts in its
approach to constitutional adjudication" -"assertion of power to
revise the Constitution, bypassing the cumbersome amendment procedure
prescribed by Article V," and "repudiation of the limits on judicial
review that are implicit in the orthodox doctrine of Marbury v.
Madison (1803)," 163 and, it may be added, are explicit in the constitutional history. In less enthusiastic terms, Professor Philip Kurland wrote that this change in judicial function presents "the most
immediate constitutional crisis of our present time, the usurpation
by the judiciary of general governmental powers on the pretext
64
that its authority derives from the Fourteenth Amendment."1
Notwithstanding, Judge Kaufman refers to the judiciary as
"the least dangerous branch," quoting Hamilton,6 5 and overlooks
Hamilton's assurance to the Ratifiers that of the three branches
"the judiciary is next to nothing." 1 66 For Hamilton's view of the
judicial role was far removed from the new and grand activist
vision, as can speedily be made plain by his own words. (1) "The
judiciary ... can take no active resolution whatever. It may betruly said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment," 167 that is, it cannot initiate policy. (2) "[T]here is no liberty,
if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and
executive powers," which speaks against the assumption of such
powers by the judiciary. 6 8 (3) The courts may not "on the pretense of a repugnancy ... substitute their own pleasure to the
constitutional intentions of the legislature," 169 much less substitute
their own "pleasure" for the policy choices of the Framers, as the
Supreme Court has done with respect to desegregation and reapportionment. (4) "To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it
is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules
and precedents ... . 1170 (5) And to make his meaning clear,
Hamilton assured the Ratifiers that the judges could be impeached for "deliberate usurpations on the authority of the legis-

163 Lusky, "Government by Judiciary": What Price Legitimacy, 6 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 403,
406, 408 (1979) (emphasis added).
164 Letter from Philip Kurland to Harvard University Press (Aug. 15, 1977) (on file at
Cornell Law Review).
165 Kaufman 684.
166

THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton), at 504 n.* (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937) (quoting 1

MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. II, ch. 6, at 185 (Philadelphia 1802)).
167

168

Id.
Id. at 504 (quoting 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 166 at 181).

169 Id. at 507.
170 Id. at 510.
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lature." 171 So confined, the judiciary was indeed "the least
dangerous branch," but that is poles apart from the judiciary of
today as portrayed by Judge Kaufman. He tells us that the
judiciary has been "increasingly entrusted" with essentially political questions, but not who "entrusted" them with these decisions.
In truth these "new" powers have been- self-conferred.
Judge Kaufman observes that "as the judiciary more frequently assumes functions ordinarily associated with the representative branches and bases its decisions on the same [legislative]
criteria used by those divisions, it is a natural tendency to treat
and think of judges as political officials." 17' 2 That natural tendency is not a whit diminished because in judicial eyes the "role
continues to be a judicial one." 173 Judges must be judged by
what they do, not by what they conceive their role to be. Inevitably, to borrow from him, as courts "become involved in issues with
profound political repercussions, [people believe] they should be
held politically accountable."' 1 74 This he views as "dangerous,"
but his distinguished predecessor, Judge Learned Hand, impliedly
held to the contrary: "If we do need a third [legislative] chamber
it should appear for what it is, and not as the interpreter of inscrutable principles." 175 Increasing assumption of legislativepolitical functions calls for greater, not less, accountability.
"Implicit in the system of government [the Framers] designed," Alpheus T. Mason wrote, "is the basic premise that unchecked power in any hands whatsoever is intolerable." 1 76 With
Charles McIlwain, I would urge that the "two fundamental correlative elements of constitutionalism for which all lovers of liberty
must yet fight are the legal limits to arbitrary [ungranted] power
and a complete political responsibility of government to the governed." 177 If judges are to govern, as they are increasingly doing,
they must be politically responsible. 71 Judge Kaufman, however,
Id. No. 81 (A. Hamilton), at 526-27.
17 Kaufman 687 (emphasis added).
173 Id. at 688.
174 Id. at 681.
175 L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 70 (1958). Hand rejected rule by nine "Platonic Guardians." Id. at 73. J.H. Ely observes that "our society did not make the constitutional decision to move to near-universal suffrage only to turn around and have superimposed on
popular decisions the values of the first-rate lawyers," i.e., judges. Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REv. 5, 38 (1979).
176 Mason, Myth and Reality in Supreme Court Decisions, 48 VA. L. REv. 1385, 1405 (1962).
177 C. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 149 (1940).
178 "[J]udicial review of legislation inevitably involves the courts in issues heavily freighted
171

with policy and political considerations and so makes the idea that judges should be
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is outraged because a California judge was "defeated in his bid for
reelection shortly after he ordered busing to desegregate the Los
Angeles public school system ... ." t9 Busing has encountered
widespread, stubborn resistance, and since it is designed to reduce
segregation it is in violation of the fourteenth amendment which
excluded federal interference with segregation.' 8 0 The people are
entitled to insist on self-government except in so far as it is limited by the Constitution; and the defeat of the California judge
by the people manifested the will of the voters to govern themselves. That busing may seem desirable to a judge is not dispositive if the power to command it was withheld.
A last word about the alleged threat removal by judges poses
to judicial independence: where Judge Kaufman regards it as an
irrefutable postulate, practical experience has shown that such
removal proceedings have little or no impact on judicial independence. Thirty-five to forty states have such removal procedures,
and there is no evidence that the administration of justice has
thereby been impaired. To the contrary, a pioneer state, California, considers that such procedures "can [raise] the caliber of the
judiciary, while concomitantly increasing the confidence of the
public in the whole judicial structure." 181 A past president of the
American Bar Association, Robert W. Meserve, who studied the
state practice, reminds us of Justice Brandeis' words that the states
are the laboratories of experimentation, and that "with substantial
unanimity" they have reached the conclusion that this is "a desirable way to approach the rare problem of the judge who needs to
be removed or retired ....-182 That practice rebuts Judge
Kaufman's assumption that "all conceptions of judicial hierarchy
would be toppled if the tenure of any judge could be ended by
any other judge issuing a writ," 183 a distorted version of the
politically responsible more plausible than it would otherwise be." Jones, The Common Law

in the United States, in

POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LEGAL CONTINUITY

116 (1976).

Kaufman 683 n.14.
180 Nathanson, Book Review, 56 TEx. L. REv. 579, 580-81 (1978). Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), an activist tells us, was decided by "a badly splintered Court.
Discontent lurked behind the facade of unanimity, symbolizing a nation that outwardly was
179

all for racial decency but inwardly was not." Since then, he writes, "the principle of racial
equality has simply not been fully accepted by the American people. The formal law of the
Constitution [what the Justices say it is] says one thing, the 'living' law of the zeitgeist
another. In the final analysis it is the zeitgeist that controls... " Miller, Brown's 25th: A Silver
Lining Tarnished With Time, 3 DIsT. LAw. 21, 25, 26 (1979).
"I' Hearings, supra note 33, at 123 (statement of Jack E. Frankel, Executive Officer,
California Commission on Judicial Qualifications).
182 Id. at 156.
183 Kaufman 695.
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country-wide panel of judges proposed by the bill he assaults. No
reports of "toppling" state hierarchies have come from the forty
states. Since the "delicate balance of collegiality and individualism"
is no more "necessary to the work of the federal bench" '8 4 than
to that of the states, "absolute" independence is patently not a sine
qua non of impartial adjudication.
It remains to emphasize that the proposed judicial removal
procedure is not designed to curtail independence, "absolute" or
not, for it is not intended to deal with the judicial takeover of
large-scale policymaking, but rather with judicial misconduct,
criminal or otherwise, when it affects the functioning of the
courts.

184

Id. at 710.

